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CHA.Pl'ER I 
INI'RODUCTION 
Experimental psychologists have long been concerned with the 
study of goal-setting behavior. During the 1930's, German psycholo-
gists studied such behavior under the rubric, ''level of aspiration. " 
The early research on level of aspiration (LOA) centered around the 
relationship between success and failure feelings and a person's 
aspirations or goals. The study of LOA soon became popular in America, 
since it was amenable to the degree or scientific rigor that was sought 
by experimental psychologists or that era. The research in .America 
was done with a strong emphasis on mathematics, objectivity, and 
strictly behavioral otservation. The operational definition that was 
used almost exclusively (Frank, 1935a) rested on the assumption that 
the LOA that a subject expressed to the experimenter was in fact his 
true aspiration. There was little or no effort to determine the 
extent to which this stated aspiration was actually representative of 
true aspirations. EXperimental psychologists generally tried to avoid 
. 
this problem, since it would have meant a return to less "rigorous" 
scientific methods. 
Psychomotor tasks have traditionally been used mat extensively 
in studies on LOA. SUch tasks have been used to examine the effects 
or reference groups on aspirations (Anderson & Brandt, 1939; Chapman & 
Vollanann, 1939; Gould & Lewis, 1940; Hertzma.n & Festi:nger, 1940; 
1 
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payne & Hauty, 1955), and the relationship of personality factors. to 
goal-setting behavior (Atwal, 1971; Festinger, 1942; Kay, 1973; 
:r.efcourt & Steffy, 1970; Rutchik, 1971; Sears, 1940) • Perhaps the 
pri.ma.I"Y focus in this area of research has been the study of the 
JD81Ul6r in which LOAs change after experiences of success or failure. 
In these experiments success and failure have been operationally 
defi:ood according to whether or not the subject's performance reached 
his stated IDA. Again this carries the implicit assumption that the 
stated aspiration is the true aspiration. This is a dubious 
assumption, and, if it is false, the subjects would not be experi-
encing success and failure in the manner that the experitoonters have 
assumed. The literature on the effects of success and failure on LOA 
has shown that success tends to be followed by increases in level of 
aspiration and failure by decreases, but the questions regarding the 
validity of the operational definitions cast some doubt upon the 
accuracy of the findings. 
One of the glaring deficiencies in this area of research has 
been the failure to reasonably determine the relationship between IDA 
and subsequent performance. There is still considerable doubt con-
cerning whether or not the specific aspiration level chosen acts as a 
determinant of subsequent perforDU:~.nce. · Early research by Mace (1935) 
indicated that persons who are given specific and reasonably difficult 
goals perform retter than those who are told to strive for vague and/or 
easy goals. Mace worked in the area of applied psych:> logy, and there 
has been little attempt to relate his work to LOA. However, Hertzma.n 
and Festinger (1940) did propose that subjects tend to use LOA as an 
3 
inCentive. Others (Bayton, 1943; Holt, 1946; Payne & Hauty, 1955) 
}lave supported the contention that aspirations can sometimes be 
determinants of performance, although the degree to which subjects 
are ego-involved in the performance task seems to be a crucial. variable. 
MOre recent research qy Locke and his associates (Bryan & Locke, 1967; 
Locke, 1965, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b; Locke & Bryan, 1966a, 1966b, 
1967; Locke, Bryan, & Kendall, 1968; Locke, Cartledge, & Koeppel, 1968) 
supported the early work of Mace (1935), suggesting that goals are 
much more important determinants of performance than was previously 
believed. But once again, there has been little attenpt to integrate 
the work in applied psychology (this time by Locke) with that in LOA 
studies. 
The study of attribution is currently popular a.JOOng social 
psychologists, and causal attributions seem to be clearly relevant to 
aspirations and performance. A person's goals and performance are 
affected by the manner in which he attributes the cause of a task 
outcome to the four factors discussed by Heider (1958): ability, task 
difficulty, effort, and luck. Furthermore, such attributions have 
been shown by McMahan (1973) to be a function of a person 1 s original 
expectations or confidence. Since an aspiration level can be con-
sidered a type of expectation, the relationship of causal attributions 
to LOA deserves exploration. 
The present study clarifies some of the interrelations between 
the three areas of research that have been mentioned: WA, goals and 
performance (Locke and his associates), and causal attribution. In 
doing so, this study used operational definitions that differed from 
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those traditionally used in LOA studies. A subject's IDA wa:s defined 
as his written (as opposed to oral) response to the question of what 
be expects his performance to be; Presumably, a written LOA minimized 
the possible effects of a public anoouncement of goals. Ricciuti 
{1951), in his comprehensive review of procedural variations in LOA 
research, made no mention of this technique ever being used. The 
manner in which subjects explicitJ.y state IDAs has not been given 
sufficient attention. Considering the social implications of' stating 
goals, the distinction between oral and recorded goals may be an 
important one, and it is unfortunate that many researchers have ignored 
this distinction. The performance task was a competitive one such 
that there was one wirmer and one loser, and success and failure were 
defined accordingly. Although this operational definition does have 
a disadvantage in that feelings of success and failure do not 
necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence with winning and losing, 
this definition probably corresponds more closely to feelings of 
success/failure than a definition based on whether the stated IDA was 
reached. 
The performance task used (electronic table tennis) had some 
advantages over more commonly used psychomotor tasks, such as dart 
throwing (Hausmann, 1933; Irwin & Mintzer, 1942; McGehee, 1940; 
Preston, spiers, & Trasoff, 1947; Ricciuti, 1951; ~nedden, 1936). It 
proVided head-to-head competition, and the participants displayed a 
fairly high level of interest and ego-involvement in the task. This 
task also has more generalizability to everyday actiVities than do 
tasks such as dart throwing and ring tossing, in that the subjects 
were faced with a complex arr~ or options and decisions. 
To determine whether IDA does act as a determinant of per-
formance, the experimenter artificially raised or lowered the 
aspiration levels of the student participants by telling them they 
would have either an advantage or a disadvantage in their competitive 
game due to a putative bias in the game equipment. One of the problems 
in trying to determine the relationship between aspiration level and 
performance has been the difficulty in separating ability from 
aspiration level. The method selected attempted to achieve this 
separation. The feasibility of this deception was suggested by the 
work of McGehee (1940) , who noted that many of his subjects blamed 
bad dart throws on the darts themselves. The use of these procedural 
variations also proVided an opportunity to replicate the findings of 
McMahan (1973) and also clarit,r the inconsistencies he found. 
The following qypotheses were therefore tested: 
1) SUbjects having a success experience tend to set higher 
IDAs for their next performance than those subjects haVing a failure 
experience. 
2) There is a positive relationship between IDA and subsequent 
performance, irrespective of ability. 
3) SUbjects who believe themselves to be at a disadvantage in 
a competitive task because of equipment bias tend to set lower IDAs 
and perform at a lower level than subjects who believe themselves to 
be at an advantage because of equipment bias. 
4) ~'Ubjects who are successful tend to attribute task outcome 
more to internal factors {ability and effort) than do subjects who 
6 
.fail; subjects who .fail tend to attribute task outcome mre to external 
.factors (task difficulty and luck) than do subjects woo succeed. 
5) SUbjects whose original expectations about task outcome 
are confirmed tend to attribute task outcome· mre to stable factors 
(ability and task difficulty) than do subjects whose original 
expectations are discon.firmed; subjects whose original expectations 
about task outcome are discon.firmed tend to attribute task outcome 
more to variable factors (effort and luck) than do subjects whose 
original expectations are confirmed. 
6) subjects who lose in a competitive task consider equipment 
bias to be a more important factor in game outcome than do subjects 
who win the competitive task. 
CHAPTER ll 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Level of Aspiration 
Historical perspective. The concept of 11level of aspiration" 
was first used by the German psychologist Dembo (1931) in relation to 
her research on the manner in which feelings of success or failure 
are related to previously-set goals. Iembo proposed that such feelings 
depend not only upon objective performance but also upon the in-
dividual. 's "level of aspiration" or performance goals. Using paper 
and pencil mazes, Jucknat (1937) found that the effect of success or 
failure in one task on the level of aspiration (LOA) in a second task 
depended upon the simiiari ty between the two tasks. These early 
German studies were basically qualitative and lacking in experimental 
rigor, with success and failure being defined by the ~'s evaluation 
of the subject's feelings. 
The first American psychologist to investigate this area was 
Frank (1935a), who operationally defined WA as "the level of future 
performance in a familiar ~task which an individual, knowing his level 
of past performance in that task, explicitly mdertakes to reach" 
(p. 119). Level of past performance was operationally defined as 
"the goodness of the individual's past performance, as he knows it" 
{p. ll9) • In contrast to the previous research in Germany, the 
AJnerican investigations of LOA relied on explicit, quantitative, and 
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behavioral def'ini tior.s. b'Uccess was defined as a performance which 
reached or surpassed the stated IDA, and failure was merely any 
perf'o:rmc:s.nce which f'ell below the IDA. Ricciuti (1951) described the 
typical experiment on lOA: 
the subject is given a series of' trials on a task; after each 
trial some sort of' score is reported to him. He is then asked 
to make some type of estimate, either in terms of goals or 
expectations, of his anticipated level of' performance on the 
following trial. Various scoring techniques may then be applied 
to the results irt an attempt to stuqy objectively such factors 
as the characteristic level of the individual's goals with 
respect to previous performance, the tendency of the individual 
to adjust his aspirations realistically in accordance with 
previous success and failure, and other related characteristics. 
(p. 2) 
The oost popular measure used in IDA studies has been the goal 
discrepancy score, defined by Spitzer (1958) as "the difference between 
a stated level of' aspiration and the previous performance score 11 
(p. 1). Other measures, such as the average goal discrepancy score, 
have also been used widely. In general, there has been a strong 
quantitative emphasis in this area of' research. 
Psychological determinants. In addition to the quantitative 
aspects of' this research, there has been a continued effort to dis-
cover the psychological determinants of the IDA and related 
ramifications of' goal-setting behavior. Frank (1935a, 1935c) cited 
three psychological needs that act as determinants of' the stated 
IDA: (a) the need to keep the IDA as high as possible, (b) the need 
to keep the IDA realistic, so that it matches future performance, and 
(c) the need to avoid failure. The relative strengths of these factors 
varies across persons, situations, and times, prompting Rotter (1942) 
to speak of' a hierarcey of' goals in a state of' nux. In an attempt to 
9 
evaluate the relative strengths of these three needs, Frank (1937) 
asked his subjects ''whether they preferred to come close to their 
guesses, or whether they preferred to do a lot better" (p. 56). The 
largest group of subjects claimed to have both of these goals. In a 
similar vein, Gould (1939) asked her subjects what they would do next 
time, and thereby classified the subjects into three groups: (a) 
those who set their IDAs at a minimum. to be surpassed, (b) those who 
set their LOAs at a maximum which they hoped to approach but were 
prepared not to reach, and (c) those who set their IDAs at arout the 
average of their performance. Thus the stated IDA can be an incentive, 
a protection against failure, or an accurate estimate. One of the 
unanswered questions in this area of research is whether the need to 
avoid failure is exaggerated qr the peculiarities of the experimental 
situation; the extent of external validity has not been clearly 
established. In the same study Gould described the factors she found 
to be operating in the observed goal-setting behaVior: 
anxiety and insecurity feelings; desire to excel, to succeed, 
to avoid failure; actual level of nnmentary strivings and the 
disparity between this level and the explicit estimates; and 
general past experiences which have helped determine the 
subject's personality organization and thus his reactions to 
such demands of inner'and outer forces. (pp. lll-ll2) 
Another study that tried to examine these psychological forces 
was done by Hertzman and Fe stinger (1940) • They found tha. t subjects 
set their IOAs slightly higher than their ability and then try to reach 
it, thus using LOA as an incentive. Using different statiHtical 
techniques, Lezak and Raskin (1950) contradicted the conclusions of 
Hert~ and Fe stinger. Instead of obtaining the usual goal dis-
crepancy score by subtracting the level of performance on the immediate 
10 
past trial .from the stated IDA, Lezak and Raskin subtracted the mean 
o.f all previous performances. While the conventional goal discrepancy 
score generally shows the subjects to have a tendency to overestimate, 
this measure showed a tendency to be cautioUs and to state a IDA 
slightly lower than the mean o.f past performances. If this is indeed 
a mre accurate measure of goal-setting behavior, it supports the 
possibility that fear of embarrassment may be an important factor 
operating in the laboratory situation. 
Siegel (1957) compared goal-setting behavior to the process 
of decision making. In setting a LOA, the subject tries to strike a 
balance between the probability of success and the probability of 
failure in obtaining an incentive or achieVing a given performance 
level. Need states and personal history are other relevant factors. 
~~egel stressed that the subject's evaluation of the probabilities 
for success and failure are quite subjective. 
Other studies have investigated the effects of external forces 
on the setting of IDA. Irwin and Mintzer (1942) told half of their 
subjects that their names and performances scores were to be made 
public, while the other h~ were told that they were only practicing. 
They found no significant results for these two levels of motivation 
on either performance or LOA. In the research on group LOA, Zander 
and Ulberg (1971) observed that social pressures arising outside a 
group influence the LOAs that members choose. Ibwever, external 
standards are less influential if they are in conflict with the group's 
prior performance or with a member's degree of desire for group success. 
l)}gas (1971) found that the racial COI!I>OSi tion of an audience did not 
11 
have a significant effect on the aspiration levels of performers. In 
general, attempts to clarify the internal and external forces that 
determine IDA have been disappointing. Although several needs have 
been shown to exist, the relative strengths and interrelations 
between these factors is not at all clear. 
Personality traits. The issue of psychological needs or forces 
as determinants of LOA led researchers into the field of personality 
types or traits. If goal-setting behavior is at least partially 
determined by psychological needs and if various needs could be 
clearly related to different personality types or traits, then there 
should also be differences in goal-setting behavior related to 
personality characteristics. Rutchik (1971) found no significant 
differences between the goal-setting behaviors of depressed and non-
depressed college students under either competitive or non-competitive 
conditions. Atwal (1971) hypothesized that persons high in anxiety 
would be ''more susceptible to written suggestions, perform more poorly 
and exhibit a greater degree of unrealistic aspiration values" (p. 
5190). The results showed that written suggestions had a significant 
effect regardless of anxi~ty level. Kay (1973) studied LOA as a 
personality trait but generally failed to support the contention that 
self -concept determines the IDA. In ariother effort to study IDA as a 
relatively stable personality characteristic, Gould (1938) measured 
the consistency in the amount and direction of the discrepancy between 
performance scores and estimates of future performance for a given 
subject using unrelated tasks, but she did not obtain definitive 
results. 
12 
Several psychologists have classified their subjects as either 
realistic or unrealistic on the basis of how they set their IDAs. 
Festinger (1942) conclUded that subjects with a realistic attitude 
had smaller goal discrepancy scores; their IDAs were roore fiexi ble 
and responsive to changes in performance. Comparable results were 
obtained by Sears (1940) and by Irwin and Mintzer (1942). Preston, 
Spiers, and Trasoff (1947) stated that realistic persons focus on the 
objective demands of their situation, while unrealistic persons are 
:nr:>re subjective. In setting their IDAs, realistic persons depend 
primarily on their performance or ability and not on other such 
statements of expectancy; the reverse is true for unrealistic 
individuals. These authors hypothesized that increasing subject 
motivation woUld intensif,r hopes and fears and lead to more unrealistic 
aspirations, and that increa:sing knowledge and familiarity with the 
task woUld lead to more realistic aspirations. However, these 
hypotheses were not supported. While degrees of realism have generallY 
been shown to be relatively stable personality characteristics in 
goal-setting oohaviors, it is unfortunate that such characteristics 
have not been clearly related to other types of behavior or other 
personality characteristics. Again, it may be that the artificiality 
of the laboratory situation has clouded such relationships, in that 
there is an important dli"rerence between the private goals that one 
sets and goals that must be announced to an experimenter. 
Using the Rotter level of aspiration board as the performance 
task, Lefcourt and Steff.y (1970) related LOA to the Rotter Internal-
External Control Scale. Persons with expectancies of internal control 
13 
of reinforcement tend to believe that they can control outcomes and 
perform accordingly. Persons with e:xpectanciel5 of external control 
perform as if the outcomes depended upon fate. Since skill was a 
factor in the performance task, persons expecting internal control 
set roore reasonable goals. The results showed that subjects who 
behaved confidently and realistically in the performance task made 
fewer shifts in a gambling task, indicating a more reasonable approach 
to that game. &'upportive results were obtained in another study 
(DuCette & Wolk, 1972), with subjects expecting external control 
making more atypical shifts in their :WAs. 
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953) related IDA to 
the need for achievement (n Ach). For the measure of aspiration 
level students were asked to state their expected examination grades, 
and n Ach was determined from TAT stories. The correlation between 
n Ach and LOA was low and insignificant for those students whose 
midterm standing was commensurate with grades in other courses; this 
correlation was high (.45) and significant for those students whose 
midterm standing was not commensurate with grades in other courses. 
The authors concluded that there is little relation between IDA and 
n Ach when reality is the main determinant of lOA, but the two are 
related when the facts of reality conflict. There are many additional 
studies (Ausubel & Schiff, 1955; Frank, 1937; Gardner, 1940; Gould & 
Kaplan, 1940; Gruen, 1945; Hanawalt, Hamilton, & Morris, 1943; 
Hausmann, 1933; Klugman, 1948) which have related personality traits 
to LOA. Others (Attkisson & Anker, 1970; Eysenck & Himmelweit, 1946; 
Fineman, 1970; Himmelweit, 1947) have investigated the manner in which 
Iii 
'I 
varioUS clinical popUlations set their IDAs. The research on clinical 
groups has shown that these individuals show greater variability in 
their goal-setting behavior than do normals, tending to set their 
goals unrealistically high, unrealistically low, or both. This seems 
to represent a protection against feelings of failure, in that the 
individual aspires to goals that are either too hard or too easy. 
The research on the relationships between personality traits 
and goal-setting behavior has been both promising and frustrating. 
It is true that many specific relationships have been found, but 
there is also a marked lack of theory to integrate these findings and 
give meaning to them. It would seem that the lack of theoretical 
frameworks is at least partly attributable to the lack of theory 
regarding IDA itself. This concept has traditionally been studied 
with great quantitative emphasis, but without corresponding emphasis 
on giving :rooaning to the numbers. 
SUccess and failure e:xperiences. When the concept of IDA was 
first introduced, it was used to examine the manner in which persons 
experience feelings of succes~ or failure. However, this line of 
research was quickly dropped because American psychologists in the 
1930's thought that it was lacking in scientific rigor. Instead, 
psychologists studied the shifts that subjects make in their LOAs 
following experiences of either success or failure. Several studies 
(Ausubel & Schiff, 1955; Festinger, 1942; Frank, 1941; Jucknat, 1937; 
McGehee, 1940; &~edden, 1936) investigated such shifts within a series 
of trials on the same task. In all of these studies, IDAs tended to 
increase after a success and decrease after a failure. However, 
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subjects were generally more responsive to success than to failur~ 
in that the decreases following failures tended to be smaller than 
the increases following successes. Also, there were IOOre upward 
shifts after successes than downward shifts following failures. 
steisel and Cohen (1951) pointed out the quantitative emphasis in 
this line of research: success and failure were defined according to 
whether or not the performance reached the stated LOA. Although these 
operational definitions certainly are advantageous in their clarit,y, 
they also have distinct disadvantages in light of the previously seen 
strategies in goal-setting behavior. These operational definitions 
are pro ba.bly only valid for realistic goals. This area of research 
has suffered from a decided lack of multiple operationism (Crano & 
Brewer, 1973). 
Others working in this field have examined the effects of 
success or failure in one task on the IDA in another task. Jucknat 
(1937) found results comparable to those for a series of trials Using 
the same task, but with the size of the transference effects depending 
on the similarity between the two tasks. Frank (1935b) found that 
IDAs on a task of IOOderate difficulty tended to be higher when following 
an easy task than when following a hard task. Using sC:Ill'lple questions 
as the first "task," Koulack (1971) cited supportive results. 
Pennington (1940) asked college students to estimate grades and found 
that one of the factors entering into these estimates was past per-
fonnance in related areas. This study differed from those of Jucknat, 
Frank, and Koulack in that the earlier success or failure experiences 
did not take place in the laboratory situation. Thus success and 
I 
'II! I 
1!1 II 
16 
failure experiences affect goal-setting behavior both in the laboratory 
and in the real world, with the size of the effect depending at least 
partiallY on task similarity. 
Reference groups. Another factor which affects the marmer in 
which individuals set their personal goals is the existence of 
reference groups. Hilgard, Sait, and l~aret (1940) described the 
existence of 11a frame of reference in which the individual's performance 
is placed on the scale formed by the performance of his group" (p. 341). 
Anderson and Brandt (1939) provided a group of subjects with the per-
formance scores of the group and then asked for LOAs. They found that 
subjects above the group performance average tended to have negative 
goal discrepancy scores, subjects close to the group average tended 
to have slightly positive goal discrepancy scores, and those subjects 
below the group average tended to have large and positive goal 
discrepancy scores. Thus subjects tended to align their :WAs with the 
group's mean performance score. SUch effects have also been dem:mstrated 
when subjects are told the scores of other groups. Gould and Lewis 
(1940) and Hertzman and Festinger (1940) found that the effects of 
reference groups depend on the characteristics of these groups relative 
to the individual subjects. Festinger (1942) found that, the higher 
the status of a group, the :roore influential it is if one is scoring 
above it and the less influential it is if one is scoring below it. 
While the influence of reference groups has been clearly demonstrated, 
Chapman and Volkmann (1939) found that such effects are negligible when 
the subjects have had a great deal of practice and know how well they 
did in this practice. 
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The results of a study by Payne and Hauty (1955) suggested 
that the reported scores of reference groups not only affect stated 
LOAs but also performance. Subjects were told the typical scores of 
persons like thelll5el ves, but actual.zy the reported scores were one 
standard deviation above that which they were purported to be. These 
subjects performed significantly better than a control group who were 
given the actual typical score. 
This study b,y P~e and Hauty raises a critical issue that was 
almost completely igmred in earlier studies, that is, the unclear 
relationship between IDA and performance. As Ryan (1970) explained, 
most of the researchers in the field of LOA have assumed that goal-
setting behavior does affect performance, but there is considerable 
doubt about the exact relationship. There are two factors which seem 
to be important causes of this confusion: (a) the lack of under-
standing as to what the stated LOA really represents, and (b) the lack 
of clear differentiation between the actual LOA and its operational 
definition, the stated IDA. 
Goals and performance. At about the same time that psychologists 
in Germaqy and the United st~tes were stuqying LOA, Mace (1935) was 
working in Great Britain on incentives and "intention." Although this 
work was not directly related to IDA, there were strong similarities. 
In Mace's study, subjects were given instructions as to how they should 
set their performance goals, and thus the situation was akin to 
supplying subjects wi. th IDAs or at least making suggestions to them as 
to how they should set their goals. The focus in this research was 
on the relationship between goals and performance. It is unfortunate 
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t,hat these early workers in experimental psychology and applied or 
industrial psychology did not combine the work in the two fields. 
Mace gave different instructions to each of four groups of 
subjects, and these group instructions, listed in increasing order of 
ultimate performance, are as follows: (a) the first group was told 
to try to surpass their previous performance, (b) the second group 
was told to try for a specific and constant score on each day 1 s 
performance, (c) the third group was simply told to do its best to 
improve, and (d) the fourth group was given a specific performance 
for each day which they were supposed to surpass if possible. The 
performance task was a computational one which had a considerable 
practice effect. The fourth group showed the greatest rate of 
improvement, and therefore a specific and difficult intention resulted 
in the best performance. 
Bayton (1943) proposed that the psychological needs which affect 
a person's LOA also affect his subsequent performance, as well as the 
manner in which he evaluates that performance. Under this assumption, 
IDA should then be positively related to performance. Bayton asked 
each of his subjects for three LOAs: the most they hoped to do, the 
least they expected to do, and what they actually expected to do. 
Using two separate performance tasks, he found a positive relationship 
between LOA and performance for the more ego-involving of these two 
tasks, with IDA referring to the subjects 1 actual expectancies. Thus 
Bayton concluded that LOA only has incentive value for ego-involving 
tasks. In a later study, Bayton (1948) generally supported his earlier 
findings. The author stated that "establishing specific aspirations, 
i 
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whether expressed or non-expressed, creates rore rapid learning in the 
earlY trials than occurs in a relatively unstructured learning 
situation" (p. 294). However, he did not obtain significant results 
. . 
tor the hypotheses that performance increases with rore specific 
aspirations and that the expression of aspirations i~ associated with 
increases in level of pertonnance, although the results were in the 
predicted direction. He again pointed out that ego-imrolvement is 
a mediating variable. 
Holt (1946) was not tully satisfied with the conclusions drawn 
by Bayton; he set out to ascertain whether IJJA was primarily an 
incentive (goal, ambition, or rotivation) or an ego defense. Holt 
recognized that this was a difficult question to answer, since both 
may be true for different people and different situations. Further-
more, depending on exactly how the subjects are asked to state their 
WAs, the stated answers can refer to different entities: hoped-for 
goals, reali~tic expectations, estimates of minimum performance, etc. 
According to the incentive hypothesis, WA should be positively 
correlated with performance, while this correlation should not exist 
under the ego-defense hypothesis. Holt asked students to predict 
grades on important tests and did not find a significant correlation 
"between aspiration and achievement" (p. 415). On the basis of these 
results, Holt claimed to have supported the ego-defense theory. This 
conclusion is dubious, since a failure to support the alternate 
hypothesis does not necessarily constitute support for the null 
lzypothesis. 
Citing these results and also the earlier results of Bayton 
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(1943), Holt proposed three hypotheses: (a) when there is minimal 
ego-inVolvement LOAs are basically realistic estimates with little 
motivational value, (b) when there is a low degree of ego-involvement, 
IOAs are somewhat representative of the degree of motivation and have 
little significance as an ego-defense, and (c) when ego-involvement 
becomes sufficiently high, ego-defensiveness is an ~rtant factor 
and the IDA is then a complex hybrid of the two considerations. In 
effect, Holt was hypothesizing a curvilinear relationship in which 
LOA would have incentive value at moderate levels of ego-involvement. 
During the 1950's there were relatively few researchers who 
attempted to further explore the relationship between LOA and per-
formance. In the mid 1960's there was renewed interest in this area, 
but this more recent research followed the emphasis of Mace on applied 
and industrial interests. studies bf Locke (1966a) and qy Locke and 
Bryan (1966a) supported the previous findings of Mace that subjects 
performed better when given specific, high goals to strive for. The 
subjects who were allowed to choose their own goals tended to set 
moderately easy ones or vague ones, like doing their best. The overall 
performance of these subjects was lower than that of the subjects given 
specific and difficult goals. However, when a subject did set a 
difficult goal without being specifically told to do so ey the 
experimenter, his performance tended to be higher. Combining these 
results, the conclusion is that subjects perform better when they 
adopt specific and difficult goals. 
According to Ryan (1970), some have criticized these studies on 
the grounds that those subjects with higher goals might be more 
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motivated in other ways, and thus there is no necessary causal 
relationship between goals or intentions and subsequent performance. 
However, other studies contradict this contention. On the basis of' 
performance and attitude ratings on an addition task, Bryan and wcke 
(1967) divided their subjects into high motivation and low motivation 
groups. The subjects in the high motivation group were then told to 
simply do their best on the next task, while the subjects in the low 
mtivation group were given specific goals by the experimenter. By 
the end of' the second retest on the task, the differences between the 
two groups were largely erased in regard to both performance and 
favorable attitudes toward the task. The authors concluded that the 
use of' specific and dif'ficul t goals can be used to increase the 
performance of' those subjects who have little motivation in the task 
situation. These authors summarized their results as follows: 
The assigning of' specific and reasonably hard goals to these 
Ss raised performance level and favored the development of' more 
positive attitudes toward the task. On the other hand, telling 
the high-motivation Ss to do their best resulted in little 
performance increase-and the development of increasingly less 
favorable attitudes toward the task. (p. 277) 
Several other studies (wcke, 1967a, 1967b; Locke & Bryan, 1966b, 
1967) supported the existence of' a positive relationship between level 
of' performance and the difficulty of' the goal assigned to the subject. 
The contention that persons who are given JOOre difficult goals not only 
perform better but also like the task better has been supported in 
other studies (Locke, 1965, 1966b; Locke & Bryan, 1967). 
Although these experiments left little doubt that the goals for 
which a person strives are at least partial determinants of' ultimate 
performance, further work by IDcke and his associates showed that this 
22 
relationship is even stronger than was previously thought. IDcke. 
(1967a) was not fully satisfied with the previous research soowing 
that knowledge of' results (KR) acts as an incentive to better 
performance. In his experimental ·design Locke separated the effects 
of KR from those of' goal-setting and found that, while the subjects 
given specific and hard goals again performed better, there was no 
significant effect for knowledge of' results. Locke concluded that the 
"effects previously attributed to differential KR were actually due 
to different levels of motivation produced by the different goals" 
(p. 324). In subsequent research, Locke, Cartledge, and Koeppel 
(1968) hypothesized tha.t KR may result in better performance if' it 
provides the subject with feedback on the type of' eiTors he is making, 
but they disputed the zootivational or incentive value of' KR. According 
to the authors, KR appears to have m:>tivational value merely because 
subjects can use this knowledge to set their goals, and thus "goal 
setting mediates the effects of' KR" (p. 476). The results supported 
their hypotheses, although their conclusions were based on a failure 
to reject the null hypothesis. 
Relating these findings to the effects of' monetary incentives 
on performance, Locke, Bryan, and Kendall (1968) hypothesized that 
"monetary incentives would affect task performance only through or by 
means of' their effects on the individual's goals or intentions" (p. 
104). The results showed a significant relationship between goals 
and performance but an insignificant relationship between monetary 
incentive and performance. Thus there was some support for the authors' 
assumption that "goals and intentions are the most i.Jnroodiate determinants 
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of an individual's behavior" (p. 104). However, the authors warned 
that the use of incentives to increase level of performance can be 
very effective, since they can serve to change a person 1 s intentions. 
The authors attempted to show how.such incentives work--through their 
effect on goals. The authors found that all-or-none incentives, in 
which a goal was automatically imposed upon the subjects, resulted in 
overall better performance than a piece-rate incentive, which allowed 
the subjects to set their own goals. Subjects under the piece-rate 
system tended to set lower goals than those under the all-or-none 
system. Goals and intentions do seem to be mediators of the effects 
of incentive on behavior, but further research is needed (Ryan, 1970). 
Locke and his associates have obviously collected an impressive 
amount of experimental data to support their belief that inducing 
subjects to strive for specific and reasonably difficult goals results 
in a higher level of performance. What is almost equally impressive, 
however, is the fact that the relevance of this research to the field 
of LOA has barely been explored. Both areas deal with goal-setting 
behavior and ult~ate performance--one with the goals that a person 
adopts of his own volition and the other with the goals that a person 
is under some type of pressure to adopt. The only psychologist to 
make a serious effort to bridge this gap is Ryan (1970). The 
explanation for this may lie in the current lack of popularity of 
LOA studies. 
Methodological considerations. Another possible explanation 
is the confusion related to methodological differences in LOA studies. 
SUtcliffe (1952) cited methodological problems as one of the reasons 
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for the folloWing inconsistencies in the research on LOA: (a) 
generalization across tasks and situations, (b) the effects of 
success and failure, (c) goal-setting behavior as a personality 
trait, and (d) the relationship between goals and performance. 
Ricciuti (1951) stated that, "The problem of methodology thus con-
stitutes a consideration of major importance both in the interpretation 
and evaluation of previous studies, and in the planning of new 
research" (p. 2). 
One source of the methodological differences is the wording 
of the question designed to elicit the subjects' LOAs. While this 
may seem to be a minor consideration, research has shown otherwise. 
Diggory (1949) found that goal discrepancy scores were twice as great 
when he asked subjects what they "hope" to do as opposed to asking 
them what they "expect" to do. Irwin and Mintzer (1942) obtained 
comparable results using the words ''hope 11 and "predict," as did 
Festinger (1942) using the words "think" or "expect" as opposed to 
"like" or "intend." Preston and Ba.yton (1941) asked each of their 
subjects to state three I.OAs: the best they expected to do, what 
they actually expected to do, and the least they expected to do. The 
actual and the maximum estimates were highly correlated. Since these 
subjects placed their actual estimates closer to their maximum than to 
their minimum estimates, the authors concluded that the subjects tended 
to be somewhat optimistic in their actual estimates. Despite these 
differences in stated LOA based on the wording of the questions, 
neither these authors nor Irwin and Mintzer found corresponding 
differences in performance. 
Another methodological problem is the performance task used. 
The majority of the experiments on WA have featured tasks that can 
be indiVidually administered, that easily yield performance scores, 
and that require a short period of time. Ricciuti (1951) stated that 
psychonDtor tasks have been the :roost popular. Examples of such tasks 
are dart throwing (Irwin & Mintzer, 1940; McGehee, 1940; Preston, 
Spiers, & Trasoff, 1947; Snedden, 1936), ring toss (Fineman, 1970; 
Rutchik, 1971), a target game (Mace, 1935), and printing (Frank, 1935). 
others have used tasks emphasizing cognitive abilities, such as 
arithmetic problems (Gould, 1939; steisel & Cohen, 1951), scrambled 
words (Rutchik, 1971), logical and spatial relations (Frank, 1935), 
mazes (Jucknat, 1937), coding (Snedden, 1936), synonyms (Gould, 1939; 
Hertzman & Festinger, 1940), symbol-digit substitution (Gould, 1939), 
and information (Hertzman & Festinger, 1940). Athletic games (Harvey, 
1971) and school grades (Holt, 1946; Pennington, 1940) have also been 
employed. Locke and his associates have used psycho:rootor, perceptual, 
and computational tasks. 
According to Ricciuti (1951), :roost psychologists working in 
the LOA field have generally agreed that the ideal task is an inter-
esting one with fairly high ego-involvement and a moderate level of 
difficulty. Few, if arry, of the aforementioned experimental tasks 
match this ideal, particularly since marry of the experiments required 
a great mmiber of repetitions of the same task. On the contrary, it 
seems that most of these tasks can best be described by the single 
word, "boring." In a person's actual life, issues of aspirations and 
goal-setting behavior are primarily related to tasks that are far more 
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complex and multivariate, with multiple options of both quantity and 
quality. The nature of the tasks that have been used severely limits 
the generalizability of the research on LOA. 
Causal Attribution 
Because of these and other frustrations that have been 
encountered, !JJA :oow seems to be a "dead" area of research. But in 
recent years, social psychologists have carried out research that is 
relevant to LOA. Experimental results indicate that the manner in 
which a person attributes causality has a direct effect on the 
aspirations or goals that he sets and on his subsequent performance. 
This research is particultirly inportant in light of tiiegel's (1957) 
discussion of the role of subjective probability and expectations in 
setting IJJAs. 
Heider (1958) described four sources that people use to explain 
and to predict task performance and task outcome: (a) ability, a 
stable and internal factor, (b) effort, a variable and internal 
factor, (c) task difficulty, a stable and external factor, and (d) 
luck, a variable and external factor. Thus the two dimensions of 
causal attribution are stable-variable and internal-external, the 
latter dimension referring to locus of control. In evaluating past 
performance or future action, a person attributes various degrees of 
causality to each of these four factors. Naturally, people must 
depend on numerous sources of evidence to make their causal 
attributions. When an individual attributes ability as the cause of 
his performance, he often bases this attribution on past performance 
in the same or a similar task, on the pattern of his performance over 
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time, and on the performance of others. In making attributions of 
causality to task difficulty, a person depends primarily on prior 
success, and, in the absence of that, on the performance of others. 
The pattern of performance or outeome over time is the nnst important 
factor in attributions to luck. Attributions to effort are based on 
factors which are often difficult to delineate. Relevant factors 
seem to be the degree of incentive, bodily cues, pattern of performance, 
and attributions to the other three sources. Two needs which 
influence these causal attributions are the needs to see oneself with 
as much ability as possible and to see oneself realistically (Jones, 
Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & ward, 1968) • 
One of the major determinants of causal attributions is the 
initial expectations that a person has in regard to outcome. Feather 
and binon (197la, 197lb) described two theoretical models that predict 
how initial expectations relate to subsequent attributions of outcome. 
The first model (Feather & Simon, 197la) adheres closely to Heider's 
(1958) formulations: 
The naive an~lysis of action predicts that when a person's 
expectation of success is disconfirmed qy an outcome, then he 
will tend to appeal to variable factors (luck and/or effort) 
to explain the outcome, since the other possible causes of 
outcomes (those involving ability and task difficulty) are 
assumed to be stable. (p. 185) 
According to the naive action model, a person's assumptions regarding 
the causes of an outcome will be confirmed if his original expectation 
is confirmed. One of the basic assumptions of this nndel is that a 
person's expectations are based on those factors in the situation that 
are stable, that is, ability and task difficulty. When the original 
expectation is confirmed, previous assumptions about cause are confirmed; 
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when expectations are not confirmed, the person then tends to attribute 
the outcome to variable factors, that is, effort and luck. 
Feather and Simon (197lb) explained the balance model in the 
following manner: 
good outcomes (success) will be attributed to self (internal 
attribution) when there is positive self-evaluation with respect 
to the performance task (high expectation of success) but will 
be disowned (external attribution) when there is negative self-
evaluation (low expectation). It also assumes that bad outcomes 
(failure) will be attributed to self (internal attribution) when 
there is negative self-evaluation (low expectation) but will be 
disowned when there is positive self-evaluation. (pp. 537-538) 
Both of these models were derived from Heider's formulQtions 
and the two are not necessarily contradictory--they often make the 
same predictions. The naive action model is more broad because, 
unlike the balance model, it takes into account stable external 
factors (task difficulty) and variQble internal f~ctors (effort). In 
this regard the naive action model adheres more closely to Heider's 
theory. However, the balance roo del makes stronger hypotheses. \.Jhereas 
the naive action model proposes that unexpected outcomes are ~ 
likelz to be attributed to variable factors than are expected outcomes, 
the balance model predicts that expected outcomes will be internally 
attributed and unexpected ·outcomes will be externally attributed. It 
must be emphasized that, under the balance model, internal attribution 
refers only to ability (and not effort) and external attribution to 
luck (and not task difficulty). Thus the balance model does not 
provide for the stable-variable dimension. 
Feather (1969) attempted to determine which of these two models 
is toore accurate. He asked subjects to make causal attributions of 
task outcome to ability and/or luck. Feather found that expected 
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results were generally attributed to ability (internal) and that 
unexpected results were generally attributed to luck (external). 
Although this experiment gave no consideration to the stable-variable 
dimension, Feather believed that the results not only supported the 
weaker (naive action) hypothesis but also the stronger (balance model) 
hypOthesis. 
In a subsequent study, Feather and Simon (197la) asked subjects 
to make attributions on a single scale with luck at one pole and 
ability at the other pole. The results showed that unexpected results 
were attributed to luck more often than were expected results. How-
ever, the authors did not find that unexpected results were generally 
attributed to luck while expected results were generally attributed 
to ability. The authors concluded that the results supported the 
weaker hypothesis but did not also support the stronger hypothesis. 
They qualified this conclusion with the observation that subjects 
tended to make intermediate ratings and avoided the internal and 
external poles; they suggested that the results might therefore be 
misleading. 
To clear up this confusion, Feather and Simon (197lb) conducted 
a similar experiment, but this time they asked each subject to make 
ratings of causal attribution on four scales: ability, luck, task 
difficulty, and effort. As in the earlier study by Feather (1969), 
they found that unexpected outcomes were generally attributed to luck 
(a variable and external factor) and that expected outcomes were 
generally attributed to ability (a stable and internal factor). The 
authors interpreted the results as being supportive of both the 
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weaker (naive ~ction) and the etronger (balance) hypotheees. · McMahan 
(1973) pointed out that this interpretation is mt fully warranted. 
In their research, Feather and Simon focused primarily on the relative 
strength of the two hypotheees--the naive action model predicting in 
terms of "more likely" and the balance model making definite predictions 
of causal attribution. In this regard the results did support the 
balance roodel. However, these authors overlooked one crucial element, 
the stable-variable dimension. The results simply showed that 1m-
expected outcomes were attributed to luck while expected results were 
attributed to ability. They interpreted luck as an external 
attribution and ability as an internal attribution, and thus the 
experiment was supportive of the balance model. One could make an 
alternate interpretation, citing luck as a variable factor and ability 
as a stable factor. Considering that the balance model makes m 
provision for effort or task difficulty, the designation of this model 
as the stronger hypothesis is certainlY debatable. The fact that the 
results of their study (Feather & Simon, 197lb) did not support the 
predictions of the naive action model regarding attributions to effort 
does not provide conclusive support for the contention that the 
balance model is better. 
Interestingly, Feather and Simon cited an experiment by Frieze 
and Weiner (1971) as supporting their conclusions. Yet the results 
obtained by Frieze and weiner seem to be more in line with the naive 
action model. The authors asked each subject to imagine that he or 
another person was to engage in an achievement-like activity. Each 
subject was given the following information about the task situation: 
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percentage of previous successes and failures at the same and at 
similar tasks, percentage of successes and failures for others, 
amount of time spent on the task, task structure, whether the subject 
himSelf or another person is performing the task, and task outcome. 
The authors believed that this was enough information to allow each 
subject to make essentially the same type of causal attributions that 
they would make in everyday life. Each subject attributed causality 
to the four factors discussed by Heider (ability, luck, task difficulty, 
and effort) on a rating scale from 0 (not a cause) to 3 (very much a 
cause). They found that success was nnre likely to be attributed -to 
internal factors than was failure, while failure was more likely to 
be attributed to external factors. The results also showed that the 
subjects tended to attribute expected outcomes to stable factors and 
unexpected outcomes to variable factors. Feather and Simon (197lb) 
were correct in citing this experiment as supportive of the stronger 
hypothesis, but they should also have emphasized that t."le predictions 
of the naive action model relating to variable factors were also 
supported. The data obtained by Frieze and weiner actually seem to 
suggest a hybrid of the two models, with the basic predictions of the 
naive action model and the strength of the balance model. 
Citing the Frieze and Weiner study, McMahan (1973) suggested 
that an "attributional" approach using all four of Heider's factors 
would be preferable to the "locus of control" approach advocated by 
Feather and his associates. The attributional approach assumes that 
people try to avoid making changes in relatively fixed perceptions. 
Thus there is a tendency to attribute unexpected outcomes more to 
l 
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variable than to stable factors, and vice versa for expected outcomes. 
Accordingly, a person who attributes an unexpected or novel outcome 
to a stable factor must ordinarily make some alterations in that factor 
which would affect future expectancies. However, an individual who 
attributes an outcome to a variable factor need not change his future 
expectancies, since expectancies are generally based on stable rather 
than variable factors. For ex~le, a student who expected an A in an 
examination but received an F would mt have to change his expectancies 
for future examinations of a comparable nature if he were able to 
attribute the unexpected outcome to bad luck or lack of effort. If, 
however, he were to attribute his F to lack of ability or task difficul~J, 
he would feel a need to change his future expectations. Thus the 
stability dimension is more salient than the locus of control dimension. 
McMahan aclrnowledged that previous research (Rotter, 1966; 
Rotter, Liverant, & Crowne, 1961) has shown that greater shifts in 
expectancy occur when attributions are made to skill rather than 
chance. However, he took issue with the interpretations offered by 
the authors of these studies, who claimed that they supported the 
inportance of the locus o~ control dimension in expectancy shifts. The 
two variables studied (skill and chance) differ along both the stable-
variable and the internal-external dimensions, and thus there is m 
reason that the results necessarily support the inportance of the 
locus of control dimension. McMahan criticized Feather (1969) on the 
same grounds. 
McMahan's theoretical position is in agreement with that of 
weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum (1971), who proposed 
i I 
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that 11expectancy shifts are primarily determined by the stability, 
rather than the locus of control, of the attributional element" 
(p. 3). Using anagrams as the experimental task, McMahan tested the 
following hypotheses: (a) the relationship between attributions to 
stable factors and subsequent expectancy is positive following success 
and negative following failure; attributions to variable factors are 
generally unassociated with subsequent expectancy or may even be 
negatively related following success and positively related following 
failure, and (b) unexpected outcomes tend to be attributed to variable 
factors (luck and effort) more than to fixed or stable (ability arid 
task difficulty) factors; expected outcomes tend to be attributed to 
stable factors more than to variable factors. The results supported 
all of the first hypothesis, and the second hypothesis was supported 
in regard to ability, luck, and effort but not task difficulty. 
Overall, this study was generally supportive of McMahan's position, 
although further research is clearly needed. 
Kukla (1972) has attempted to combine attributional theory and 
expectancy theory, on the assumption that "the way people attribute 
the causes of task outco~s is an important determinant of the 
characteristics of their performance on these tasks" (p. 454). Kukla 
took the basic mathematical tenets of expectancy theory regarding 
subjective probability of some occurrence and its subjective value 
and extended this to attribution. Looking at intensity of effort 
rather than direction of behavior, the author stated that subje~ct~·__....._ __ 
probability depends in part on how much effort the person ~~~ Jo Q W £" ;):> 
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expend. Kukla reported that Atkinson (1958) had found la:f. the y 
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relationship between perceived difficulty and intended effort fonned 
an inverted U-cu.rve, with subjects intending to expend little effort 
if the task was seen as either too hard or too easy. The degree of 
intended effort also depends on the individual's perception of his 
own ability; less ability requires greater effort and nnre ability 
requires less effort. The research found that perceived difficulty 
decreases with continued success experiences and increases with con-
tinued failure experiences. Relating this to effort, a subject who 
first sees a task as easy but then has successive failures should then 
try harder, while a subject who first sees the task as being difficult 
but has continued success experience should also then try harder. 
Increased effort should result in a higher level of performance for 
both types of subjects. Kukla cited his data as being supportive, 
but neither his formulation nor Atkinson's accounted for all of it. 
The literature from the three general areas that have been 
discussed (LOA, intentions and performance, and attribution) show 
obvious interrelations. All three are concerned with performance in 
achievement-like activities as a function of the manner in which a 
person evaluates the task situation. Several of the variables which 
enter into this evaluation are: ability, task difficulty, 1 uck, 
intended effort, and various types of goals and aspirations. It is 
believed that this stuqy clarifies certain interrelations. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects. The subjects were 112 male undergraduate students 
enrolled in the introductory psychology course at Loyola University 
of Chicago. Those persons who had previously played with the Magnavox 
Odyssey were not allowed to participate. Fach participant was 
randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions. 
Design. This study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 design: previous 
success or failure experience (win or loss), previous success or 
failure experience of the subject's opponent, and putative advantage 
or disadvantage due to equipment bias. The following dependent 
measures were obtained: written IJJA following the practice game, 
written LOA following the information that a "bias" exi8ted, game 
performance, and ratings of causal attribution on five scales. All 
measures of IfJA and performance were obtained in terms of both 
winning/losing and point differential. Because of a statistical 
dependency, only the data from one student of the competing pair was 
analyzed. 
Apparatus. A game of electronic table tennis was the 
performance task. This game is one of several that can be played 
using an electronic device marketed b.Y the Magnavox Corporation; this 
device is known as the Magnavox Odyssey and is available to the public. 
The Odyssey i8 attached to a television·and the game is played on the 
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television scr~en using electronic controls. 
Procedure. At the start of the testing session, each student 
individually practiced playing this game with the male experimenter 
(the author) for approximately 3 minutes. The experimenter then 
asked the subject to play a practice game up to a score of 11. The 
experimenter had sufficient expertise to control the outcome of this 
game. Dapending on the experimental condition to which the student 
had been assigned, the experimenter either won or lost this game, with 
the loser always scoring from 3 to 7 points. 
Upon completion of this game the subject was told that he was 
to play another game, this time with another student. The subject 
was then asked to write his LOA on a sheet of paper {see Appendix A) 
in response to the written question, "Ib you expect to win or to lose 
the game you are about to play'?" This sheet also asked the student 
to predict the final score of the game, with the winner being the 
first person to reach a score of 21. Presumably, the wording of these 
questions tapped the subjects' realistic aspirations. The use of a 
written LOA was designed to minimize the possible effects of a public 
announcement of goals • 
This entire procedure was then repeated with the student who 
was scheduled to be the opponent of the first subject. Since the first 
student was idly waiting during this time, this factor was counter-
balanced in all experimental conditions. The two competing students 
were then brought together for their game, but were not told how 
well their opponent did in the practice game. 
At this point the experimenter stated that he was going to 
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adjust the game equipment such that one of the players would be at a 
disadvantage, and consequently, the other at an advantage. The 
subjects were told which of the players would have the advantage and 
which the disadvantage, but were also told that the degree of the 
bias would not be divulged. The source of the putative bias was the 
amount of "play," or the responsiveness, in the players 1 individual 
control units. In actuality, there was no physical bias. While the 
experL~nter adjusted a bogus control on the back of the television 
set, the students were instructed to write new LOAs, in the same 
manner as before. The justification for this was the new information 
regarding equipment bias. 
Upon completion of the experimental game, each subject made 
causal attributions (see Appendix B) on five scales: ability, task 
difficulty (including the ability of the opponent), luck, effort, 
and equipment bias. Each of these factors was rated on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from 1 (not at all a cause of the outcome of the game) 
to 7 (very much a cause of the outcome of the game). In order to 
minimize any detrimental effects of deception, a summary of the 
completed experiment was made available to the participants. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
For all hypotheses regarding performance and/or LOA, two depend-
ent measures were used: win/lose and point differential. Accordingly, 
each of the relevant hypotheses was subjected to two forms of statistical 
analysis, depending on the measure under consideration. Each of these 
dependent measures has a particular advantage. Point differential 
provides a more sensitive measure qy considering not only winning/. 
losing (positive/negative differential) but also the degree of the 
differential. However, in game competition the opponents probably 
consider point differential to be a minor conaiaeration as compared to 
winning or losing. The difference between victories of 2 and 4 points 
is not the same as the di1'1"erence between a victory by 1 point and a 
loss b,y 1 point. To the opponents, the point differential may have 
little motivational value, and thus players may show a decrease in 
effort when a game is "in the bag." In general, comparisons of the 
two forms of statistical analyses indicated that winning/losing is 
probably the more accurate· measure of both lOA and performance. 
ijypothesis 1: The Effects of Practice Game Experience on LOA 
The data were fir~t analyzed b,y means of the chi-square test to 
determine whether those students who had a success experience (winning 
the practice game) set higher LOAs in terms of win/lose than those 
students who had a failure experience. The analysi~ of these data, 
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as depicted in.Table 1, supported this hypothesis (x 2 = 8.45, df = 1, 
£ < .oo5). The correlation between these two measures, as determined 
by the phi coefficient, is .39. A t test on point differentials also 
indicated that students who had won the practice game set significantly 
higher LOAs than those who had lost the practice game (1 = 2.50, 
2£ =54,£< .01). The point biserial correlation between these two 
measures was .32. Thus previous success or failure and subsequent 
LOA were roore strongly related when both were measured only in terms 
of winning/losing. 
gypothesis 2: A Positive Relationship Between LOA and Performance 
The second hypothesis proposes a positive relationship between 
LOA and performance. This contention was tested for both the original 
LOA and the second LOA (recorded after being told of the putative 
bias). Using the dependent measure of win/lose, the results, shown 
in Table 2, indicate the existence of a significant and positive 
relationship between the original LOA and performance (x 2 = 4.42, 
df = 1, E.< .025, phi = .28). Using point differentials, supportive 
results were also obtained b,y the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient (£ = .31, df ~54, z = 2.33, £ < .01). The mean of the 
original LOAs was 0.32 and the stanaard deviation was 6.11; the mean 
of the performances was -o.16 and the standard deviation was 9. 74. 
As in the first hypothesis, the strength of the relationship was 
greater when the dependent measure of win/lose was used. 
As shown in Table 3, the relationship between the second LOA 
and performance was positive but not significant when considering only 
winning/losing (x 2 = 2.30, df = 1, E.> .05, phi= .20). However, this 
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Table 1 
The Effects of Practice Game Experience on Original LOA 
(a) Dependent measure: win/lose 
Experience in Practice Game 
Win Loss 
Win 25 14 
Original IJJA 
lose 3 14 
(b) Dependent measure: point differential 
Experience in Practice Game 
Win I.Dss 
M SD M SD 
I Original LOA 2.29 J.92 -1.64 7.35 
Table 2 
Relationship Between Original LOA and Performance 
Win 
Performance 
!Dse 
Original LOA 
Win 
25 
14 
Lose 
5 
12 
l 
I 
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Table 3 
Relationship Between Second LOA and Performance 
Win 
Performance 
U:>se 
Win 
23 
14 
second LOA 
Lose 
7 
12 
! 
I 
I 
I 
l 
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relationship was found to be roth positive and significant by' the 
pearson correlation on point differentials (~ = .25, df =54, z = 1.87, 
£. < .05). The mean of the second WAs was 0.46 and the standard 
deviation was 6. 71; as stated before, the mean of the performances 
was -0.16 and the standard deviation was 9. 74. In this case, the 
strength of the relationship was greater when point differentials were 
used as the dependent measure. 
The QY,pothesis stating that there is a significant, positive 
relationship between LOA and performance was supported by three of the 
four statistical tests used, and even the fourth test showed the 
relationship to be positive albeit nonsignificant. Performance was 
more strongly related to the original LOA than to the second LOA. The 
second LOAs had greater variance than the original LOAs, probably 
because the stUdents were given no information about the degree of 
the putative bias. All four of the computed correlations were low, 
ranging from .20 to .31. Thus the relationship between LOA and sub-
sequent performance was relatively weak. 
Hypothesis 3: The Effects of Putative Equipment Bias on LOA and 
Performa.nc~ 
A chi-square test (shown in Table 4) indicated that students 
with the putative advantage set significantly higher LOAs than those 
students with the putative disadvantage ( x2= 15.61, ~ = 1, E.< .ooo5, 
phi = .53). supportive results were also obtained in an analysis of 
variance on point differentials ([.(l,52) = 28.09, E. < .001). Thus 
the deception of equipment bias was effective in artifically raising 
and lowering LOAs in the anticipated manner. Furthe:rm::>re, roth a 
I 
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Table 4 
The Effects of Putative Equipment Bias on IDA 
(a) Dependent measure: win/lose 
(b) 
Second IDA 
Dependent measure: 
Source 
Bias 
S/F* 
Interaction 
Error 
Total 
Win 
Lose 
Putative Bias 
Advantage 
26 
2 
Disadvantage 
11 
17 
point differential 
Two-Way Fixed Effects ANOVA 
ss df 
-
MS F 
848.64 1 848.64 28.09 
52.07 1 52.07 1. 72 
52.07 1 52.07 1.72 
1571.14 52 30.21 
2523.93 55 
*success or failure in practice game 
E. 
<.001 
n.s. 
n.s. 
' 
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chi-square test and an ANOVA (see Table 5) indicated that the students 
with a putative disadvantage in the competitive game performed at a 
significantlY lower level than the students with a putative advantage 
(x 2 = 5.82, df = 1, p_< .01, phi= .32; ~(1,48) = 5.42, E.< .025). Thus 
the results supported all of the third hypothesis. 
!ID'othesis 4: The Effects of Winning/IDsing on Causal Attributions 
Four ANOVAs were used to test the hypothesis that successful 
persons attribute task outcome more to internal factors (ability and 
effort) than do persons who fail, while persons who fail attribute task 
outcome more to external factors (task difficulty and luck) than do 
successful persons. Since statistical analysis of this hypothesis 
involved four ANOVAs, a sigirl..ficance level of .01 was chosen. These 
ANOVAs, as shown in Table 6, did not reveal any significant differences 
in the ratings on the four sources of causal attribution. Table 7 
depicts mean ratings on the four scales. 
Hypothesis 5: The Effects of Winning/Losing and Confirmed/Dis confirmed 
Expectations on Causal Attributions 
Four ANOVAs were used to test for differences in ratings of 
causal attribution as a function of whether personal expectations were 
confirmed or disconfirmed. As shown in Table 8, no significant 
differences were found in the ratings on the four scales (for reasons 
previouslY stated, an alpha level of .01 was again chosen). :Mean 
ratings are provided in Table 9. 
Rypothesi::; 6: The Effects of Winning/Losing and Putative Bias on 
Ratings of ~uip!OOnt Bias 
The ANOVA depicted in Table 10 indicated that stUdents who won 
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Table 5 
The Effects of Putative Equipment Bias on Competitive Performance 
(a) Dependent neasure: win/lose 
Putative Bias 
I 
Advantage Disadvantage 
l Win 20 10 Performance lose 8 18 
(b) Dependent measure: point differential 
l Three-W~ Fixed Effects ANOVA Source ss df MS F E.. Bias 498.02 1 498.02 5.42 <.025 
s/F* 189.45 1 189.45 2.06 n.s. 
OS/ OF** 4.02 1 4.02 0.04 n.s. 
Bias x S/F 46.45 1 46.45 0.51 n.s. 
Bias X os/OF 17.16 1 17.16 0.19 n.s. ,11 ,: 
lr, 
I' 
S/F x OS/OF 135.16 1 135.16 1.47 n.s. 
,11: 
'I'' Bias x S/F x OS/OF 7.88 1 7.88 0.09 n.s. I'' ,,,, 
liti 
4411.43 48 
':,1; 
Error 91.90 1111 
'II 
,!i 
Total 5309.55 55 
'I' li1 
!II' 
*success or failure experience in the practice game 
**The opponent's success or failure experience in the practice game 
(a) 
' 
I 
I 
I 
(b) 
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Table 6 
ANOVAs (Least Squares) on the Effects of Winning/Losing 
on Causal Attributions 
Ratings on ability 
Source ss df MS F E. 
W/1* 1.01 1 1.01 .66 n.s. 
AID** 0.56 1 0.56 .36 n.s. 
Interaction o.6o 1 o.6o -39 n.s. 
Error 80.33 52 1.54 
Total 82.50 55 
*winning or losing the competitive game 
**Advantage or disadvantage in the competitive game 
Ratings on task difficulty 
Source ss df MS F E. 
W/L o.85 1 0.85 .41 n.s. 
A/D o.oo 1 o.oo .00 n.s. 
Interaction 0.28 1 0.28 .14 n.s. 
Error 106.99 52 2.06 
Total 108.12 55 
!II' I 
II! 
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Table 6 
(contd) 
(c) Ratings on 1 uck 
Source ss df Ms F E. 
W/1 8.00 1 8.00 2.79 n.s. (E. > .01) 
A/D 7.02 1 7.02 2.44 n.s • 
Interaction 0.74 1 0.74 • 26 n.s. 
Error 149.22 52 2.87 
Total 164.98 55 
(d) Ratings on effort 
Source ss df MS F E. 
W/L 9.96 1 9.96 5.61 n.s. (E_ > .01) 
A/D 6.26 1 6.26 :;.53 n.s • 
Interaction 0.4l 1 0.41 • 23 n.s. 
Error 92.~5 52 1.78 I 
:1'. 
Total 108.98 55 
;1,11 
''I 
ill: 
'''I; I'.' 'I·~ ,, 
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Table 7 
I Mean Ratings of Causal Attribution According to Game Outcome and Putative Bias 
I Task Skill Difficulty Luck Effort N 
Winners (overall) 5.17 5.00 3.17 5.03 30 
I with advantage 5.10 4.95 2.95 4.85 20 with disadvantage 5.30 5.10 3.60 5.40 10 
Losers (overall) 5.35 5.27 2.85 4.39 26 
I with advantage 5.62 5.38 3.50 3.75 8 with disadvantage 5.22 5.22 2.56 4.67 18 
With advantage (overall) 5.25 5.07 3.11 4.54 28 
With disadvantage (overall) 5.25 5.18 2.93 4.93 28 
fl ,, 
:i 
l 
l 
(a) 
I 
I 
(b) 
5o 
Table 8 
ANOVAs (Least &Juares) on Ratings of Causal Attribution 
as a Function of Winning/Losing and 
Confirmed/Dis confirmed Expectations 
Ratings on ability 
Source ss df MS F E. 
C/D* 0.34 1 0.34 .22 n.s. 
W/L** 0.67 1 0.67 .43 n.s. 
Interaction 0.$4 1 0.54 .35 n.s. 
Error 80.95 . 52 1.56 
Total 82.50 55 
*confirmed or disconfirmed expectations about winning or losing 
the game 
**winning or losing the competitive game 
Ratings on task difficulty 
Source ss· df MS F E. 
C/D 1.93 1 1.93 .96 n.s • 
W/L 1.93 1 1.93 • 96 n.s. 
Interaction 0.24 1 0.24 .12 n.s. 
Error 104.02 52 2.00 
Total 108.12 55 
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A Table 8 
I {contd) 
(c) Ratings on luck 
Source ss df MS F E. 
C/D 6.83 1 
I 
6.83 2.30 n.s. (E..> .01) 
I W/L 3.83 1 3.83 1.29 n.s • Interaction 0.02 1 0.02 • 01 n.s. 
Error 154.30 52 2.97 
I Total 164.98 55 
(d) Ratings on effort 
I Source ss df Ms F E. 
C/D 2.67 1 2.67 1.35 n.s. (E..> .01) 
W/L 3.19 1 3.19 1.61 n.s. 
Interaction 0.16 1 0.16 .08 n.s. 
Error 102.97 52 1.98 
Total 108.98 55 
. 
J 
)I 
Table 9 
I Mean Ratings of Causal Attribution as a Function of Winning/Losing and Confirmed/Disconfirmed Expectations 
Task 
Skill Difficulty Luck Effort N 
Confirmed (overall) 5.29 5.23 2.8o 4.97 35 
won the ga.ma 5.26 5.13 3.00 5.17 23 
lost the game 5-33 5.42 2.42 4.58 12 
Disconfirmed (overall) 5.19 4-95 3.38 4-33 21 
won the game 4.86 4.57 3.71 4-57 7 
lost the ga.ma 5.36 5.14 3.21 4.21 14 
L 
I 
j 
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Table 10 
AIDVA (least Squares) on Ratings of Equipment Bias 
as a Function of Winning/Losing and Putative Bias 
Source ss df MS F 
- -
W/L* 20.33 1 20.33 6.55 
** A/D )8.47 1 )8.47 12.39 
Interaction ).20 1 ).20 1.03 
Error 161.43 52 ).10 
Total 223.43 ,, 
*winning or losing the competitive game 
E. 
<.05 
<.01 
n.s. 
**Having the putative advantage or disadvantage in the competitive game 
I 
f 
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the competitive game gave significantly lower ratings to the importance 
of equipment bias on game outcome than did students who lost the game 
(!.(1 , 52) = 6.55, p_ < .05). FUrthermore, students With the putative 
disadvantage rated this factor significantly lower than students with 
the putative advantage ([(1 ,52) = 12.39, p_ < .01). There was no 
significant interaction effect. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Level of Aspiration 
The results were in accordance with the findings of Festinger 
(1942) and many others that LOA tends to be higher following success 
and lower following failure. This tendency has been consistently 
reported throughout the history of research on LOA, and thus the present 
replication was hardly unexpected. However, the present stuqy general-
ized this tendency to a situation in which success and failure were 
defined not in terms of reaching a previously stated LOA, but rather in 
terms of winning or losing a competitive task. It can then be said 
that subjects do at least partiallY respond to the realities of their 
past experience when setting LOAs. This also implies that at least one 
factor in the setting of aspirations is realistic expectations. But 
the data also indicate that LOA is far from the realistic prediction 
that a computer might make; LOA is much zoore than a prediction. Of the 
56 students whose data was analyzed, 39 aspired to win their competitive 
games and only 17 expected to lose. In part, this may be a result of 
the possibility that losing to the experimenter was less of a failure 
experience than defeating the experimenter was a succes~ experience, 
as the students generally suspected the experimenter of being an expert 
at the game task. Yet a sizable majority (37 of 56) aspired to win on 
the second LOA, even though half (28) were told that they would have 
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a disadvantage in their game. Thus it seems that, in addition to 
realistic expectations, personal hopes and wishes are also significant 
elements in the setting of aspiration levels and goals. 
The results reveal an interesting contrast between those who 
aspire to win and those who aspire to lose. respite the fact thc.t 70% 
of the students (39 of 56) aspired to win, the mean aspiration level 
was a victory by a score of 21.00 to 20.68. OVerall, students with 
winning WAs expected closer games (mean point differential of + 3. 92, 
with a range of +1 to +9) than students with losing WAs (100an point 
differential -?.94, with a range of -3 to -16). The reason for this 
contrast between aspiring winners and aspiring losers is not clear. 
It may be that aspiring losers have a greater need to psychologically 
prepare themselves for the worst possible outcome or for failure of 
any type. Also, it may be psychologically hazardous to hope for a 
resounding victory. In any case, the two groups seem to employ 
different strategies in the setting of LOAs. This probably accounts 
for the higher correlation between previous success/failure and LOA 
when the dependent measure was winning/losing (phi = • 39, point 
biserial r = .32). 
As hypothesized, the putative bias turned out to be a real bias, 
albeit a psychological rather than a physical one. Those students with 
the "advantage" performed significantly better than those students with 
the "disadvantage." This provides a possible explanation for the 
following phenomena often experienced by athletes: hot t~treaks, 
slumps, and "psyching out 11 the opponent. It is the author's opinion 
that the source of the psychological bias was a self -fulfilling 
Ill. 
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prophecy. The mean rating of causal attribution to equipment bias was 
J.22 (on a scale of 1 to 7). This mean rating is relatively high 
considering that absolutely no physical bias existed, and this should 
have been readily apparent to the competitorS. It appears that the 
students simply believed themselves to be at an advantage/disadvantage 
and performed accordingly. .Although the best explanation of the 
performance differences seems to be that a self-fulfilling prophecy 
occurred, two alternate explanations will also be considered. 
The first alternate explanation is as follows : persons who 
believe themselves to be at a disadvantage tend to set lower aspiration 
levels, and, as a result of the decreased LOAs, perform at a lower 
level than persons believing themselves to be at an advantage. Thus 
performance differences were the result of the artificially raised or 
lowered LOAs. 
This explanation is plausible but not probable. The experimental 
deception of equipment bias was indeed effective in manipulating the 
students to artificially raise or lower LOAs. Yet performance was more 
strongly related to the original LOAs than to the second LOAs. If 
changes in LOA were the cause of performance changes, the opposite 
should have been found. Furthermore, even the relationship between 
performance and original LOAs was weak although significant and 
positive, with .Jl being the largest correlation found in this study. 
It is thus unlikely that changes in LOA resulted in performance changes. 
Before the data were collected, the author had considered the 
possibility that one way to increase the performance of certain 
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individuals would be to get them to raise their aspiration levels. But 
the results of this study suggest that such an approach would have 
little if any effectiveness. Instead, it appears that higher LOAs are 
more often the result of, rather than the cause of, an individual 
"psyching himself up" for a performance. Unrealistically low LOAs 
probably represent a need to prepare for the possibili41 of negative 
outcomes (an ego defense). It is possible that getting certain 
individuals to raise their LOAS might result in better performance, 
but this effect would be primarily due to factors other than the higher 
aspiration levels chosen, such as the instillation of hope or greater 
confidence. The method used by :Wcke and his associates {giving persons 
specific and reasonably difficult goals for which to strive) offers 
far more promise for improving performance. MOreover, the results of 
this stuqy indicate that LOA is an ineffective operational definition 
for the stuqy of realistic goals or expectations. The setting of a 
LOA is a complex behavior, and LOA offers most promise as one way to 
examine personality traits. 
The other alternate explanation for the observed performance 
differences is that the p~tative bias provided the students having 
the disadvantage with a social excuse for losing and thus they had 
less motivation to give their full effort. Conversely, the students 
having the putative advantage might be more motivated to give full 
effort, since a loss would be more bruising to the ego than if the 
game had been fair. This is certainly the more plausible of the two 
alternate explanations being offered, but this explanation is still 
weaker than that of the self-fulfilling prophecy. From the author's 
• I 
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observations of the participating students, there was a high degree of 
interest and involvement in the electronic table tennis g~s. With 
one exception, all the students appeared to be doing their best to win. 
Furthermore, there were no significant differences in the ratings on 
the amount of effort expended (the "disadvantaged" students rated this 
factor only slightly higher, 4.93 to 4.54). 
The question then arises a~ to how a self-fulfilling prophecy 
mi..ght have operated to alter performance, if not through the amount of 
effort expended. Non-systematic observations by the experimenter 
suggested that the self-fulfilling prophecy operated by changing the 
playing strategies of the opponents, that i~, the "game plans" were 
altered. The students with the advantage tended to play a more confident 
game, combining caution, risk, and patience. The students with the dis-
advantage tended to be more prone to adopting one of two strategies: a 
very cautious defensive game or a somewhat reckless offensive game. 
These two strategies may have resulted from the putative bias being in 
the defensive controls. For whatever reason, the game strategies used 
by the "disadvantaged" students were less effective. It must be 
emphasized that these observations concerning g~ strategies were not 
aystematic and may have been affected by the experimenter's expectations. 
Further research is needed to determine how such a self-fulfilling 
prophecy might operate. It may be that the explanation lies in both 
altered game strategies and a social excuse for failure resulting in 
decreased effort. 
Causal Attribution 
The ratings of causal attribution showed remarkable similarity 
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among the groups studied. There were no significant differences in the 
ratings on any of the four factors discussed by Heider (1958): ability, 
task difficulty, luck, and effort. Neither of the hypotheses suggested 
b,y prior research on causal attribution (the. fourth and fifth hypotheses) 
were supported. 
The fourth hypothesis tested was that successful students tend 
to attribute task outcome IOOre to internal factors (ability and effort) 
than do students who fail, while students who fail tend to attribute 
task outcome more to external factors (task dii'ficulty and luck) than 
do successful students. This hypothesis was based on the findings of 
Frieze and Weiner (1971), who asked subjects to make causal attributions 
after being given imaginary situations. The failure to replicate the 
findings of Frieze and 1.J'einer can be explained in two ways. First, the 
results of either study could be statistically improbable events, that 
is, chance happenings. This is an often-overlooked possibility, but it 
must be emphasized that the present findings merely represent the 
failure of one attempt to support earlier findings. An alternate 
explanation, favored by the author, is that the different findings 
may be the result of differences in the experimental tasks. The results 
of Frie~e and Weiner were based on causal attributions in fantasi~ed 
situations, and attempts should be made to generali:iie these findings to 
in vivo situations. Furthermore, the present study used a very special 
experimental. task: competition in an athletic-like game. Athletic 
competition seems to have its own ethics of causal attribution; there 
is a code of good sportsmanship that calls for gr~cious winners and 
good losers. In the present stuqy ability and task difficulty 
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(including the opponent's abilit,y) were the two factors rated highest, 
with mean ratings of 5.25 and 5.12 respectively. Effort received a 
mean rating of 4. 74, while luck received a lowly 3.02. No claims are 
being made about the degree to which these findings can be generalized 
to other forms of game competition, as any such conclusions are clearly 
beyond the scope of this experiment. vJhat is being suggested is that 
future researchers be aware that causal attributions take place in a 
social situation, and, as such, are affected qy social norms and 
expectations. Theories and findings on causal attribution may have 
varying significance depending on the nature of the experimental task 
and the relevant social expectations. Social norms relating to causal 
attribution may not be the same for the successful politician as they 
are for the successful golfer. The social context of causal attributions 
should be given greater attention. 
The results also failed to support the fifth hypothesi~, that 
causal attributions are meaningfully related to a person's original 
expectations. The results supported neither the naive action model 
nor the balance model. The failure to support either nndel can be 
explained in several ways. AS before, the results can be due to a 
chance happening or to differences in the experimental tasks. But it 
seems more reasonable to suggest that this hypothesis was not given a 
fair test. In order to test this hypothesis, it was assumed that the 
IDA represented the student's original expectations. However, the 
author has already concluded that IDA is a poor operational definition 
for a person's realistic expectations. Since a basic assumption was 
probably violated, no definitive conclusions regarding the fifth 
I 
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hypothesis can be made. 
The finding of significant differences in the ratings on 
equipment bias must be interpreted with caution. Losers gave signifi-
cantly higher ratings to this factOr than did winners, and students 
with the putative disadvantage rated this factor significantly lower 
than did stUdents with the putative advantage. The meaning of these 
findings is vague because of unanticipated sources of bias. First, 
the students with the disadvantage were in a far better position to 
determine that no physical bias existed, since it was their control 
unit that had alledgedly been altered. Thus these students rated this 
factor significantly lower than the students having the advantage. 
Second, it makes sense that this factor would be given lower ratings 
by those stUdents who won despite having a disadvantage or lost despite 
having an advantage. Yet there were no significant interaction effects 
to negate the tendency of losers to rate this factor higher than 
winners. The only conclusion to be made is a cautious one: losers 
are more likely to blame failure on equipment bias than winners are to 
~ive credit for success to equipment bias. 
Methodological Considerations 
The present ~tuqy is a high-risk candidate for experimenter 
effects. The experiences of the students in the practice game probably 
had a sizable effect on performance in the actual competition. The 
experimenter tried to keep the practice game experience as constant as 
possible, but this was a. formidable task. Those students who were 
beaten in the practice game probably received better playing experience 
than those students who were allowed to win. When the experimenter 
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played better, the student had a better learning experience. The 
experimenter may then have l.mconsciously affected game outcome by 
giving differential learning experiences. Although every conscious 
attempt was made to be fair (perhaps even going in the opposite 
direction), it would have been better to use a confederate who was 
unaware of the expected results. 
A13 a final note, the experimenter's casual observations provided 
strong indications of the social factors in stating IDAs. With very 
few exceptions, the stuaents deliberately placed their recorded LOAs 
face down on their desks. No students were observed to inquire a lout 
the IDAs of their opponents. In general, the student~ acted as if 
these shea~ carried their private secrets, and tried to minimize 
disclosure even to the experimenter. This supported the author's 
previously-stated emphasis on differentiating between LOA (goals 
communicated to another in a social setting) and private goals. These 
observations also suggest that written goals may represent 100re 
realistic expectations, and thus should be given more widespread 
usage. 
r 
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I 
IX> you expect to win or to lose the game you· are about to play'/ 
WIN __ _ 
IDSE ----
What do you expect the final score to be? 
21 to 
II 
IX> you expect to win or to lose the game you are about to play? 
WIN __ _ IDSE ---
What do you expect the final score to be? 
21 to---
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The results of the game you have just finished can be attributed to 
several factors. Please rate each of the factors below according to 
how important they were in the outcome of your game. Each factor is 
to 'be rated on a scale from: 
1 - not at all a cause of the outcome of the game to, 
7 - a very important cause of the outcome of the game. 
The higher the rating, the more important you consider that factor to 
'be. Please read all the factors before rating them. To make your 
rating, just circle the appropriate number. 
1. Your skill or a bi1i ty. 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
2. The difficulty of the game, including 
the skill of your opponent. 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
3. Luck, whether good or bad. 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
4. How hard you tried (your effort). 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
s. Having the advantage or disadvantd.ge 
with the equipment. 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
Did you win or lose this game? WIN __ _ LOSE---
By what score? 21 to----
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